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Abstract 
This paper reports work in progress on an explanation facility for Bayesian 
conditioning aimed at improving user acceptance of probability-based deci­
sion support systems. Design of the facility, which appears to be reasonably 
domain-independent, is based on an information processing model that ac­
counts both for biased and normative behavior in reasoning about conditional 
evidence. Preliminary results indicate that the facility is both acceptable to 
naive users and effective in improving understanding of Bayesian condition­
ing. 
Introduction 
Decision aids appear necessary to overcome the systematic errors to which 
people are prone in uncertainty reasoning (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982) but 
the availability of automated tools has not led to significant reliance on 
normative techniques of reasoning. In fact automating normative processes 
seems to be detrimental to their introduction in many applications. Acceptance 
problems may stem from the translation between mental models of a decision 
situation to a formal model and back from the implications of the formal model 
to terms users can understand. 
Because rule-based expert systems are decision aids based on descriptive 
models of human problem solving behavior, the assumption is often made that 
a recapitulation of program actions paraphrased in natural language will au­
tomatically be understandable to users. When rule-based inference was ex­
tended in MYCIN and Prospector to account for uncertainty, the typical rule 
backchaining technique of explanation was extended in a straight-forward 
manner. Here is a MYCIN rule as it would be printed in an explanation: 
IF: (1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
THEN: 
The identity of the organism is not known with certainty, and 
The stain of the organism is gramneg, and 
The morphology of the organism is rod, and 
The aerobicity of the organism is aerobic 
There is strongly suggestive evidence (.8) that the class of 
the organism is enterobacteriaceae. 
But the explanation facilities of most expert systems do not explain the updat­
ing of certainty that results from a rule executing. 
There recently have been efforts to develop explanation facilities for deci­
sion support systems which employ normative methods (Spiegelhalter, 1985; 
Reggia and Perricone, 1985; Politser, 1984; Norton, 1986; Langlotz, Shortliffe, 
and Fagan, 1986). However, none of the approaches is based on an explicit 
model of cognition that accounts for the dissonance that occurs when user's 
compare normatively calculated probability with an internally generated es­
timate. In fact, the general belief in the AI community is that representation 
of uncertainty based on probability is not explainable: 
It is difficult to imagine what explanation of its actions the program [based on 
Bayes' rule] could give if it were queried about computed probabilities. No 
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matter what level of detail is chosen, such a program's actions are not (nor were 
they intended to be) a model of the reasoning process typically employed by 
physicians. Although they may be an effective way for the computer to solve 
diagnosis problems, there is no easy way to interpret these actions in terms that 
will make them comprehensible to humans unacquainted with the program. (Barr 
and Feigenbaum, 1982) 
The current approach to building understandable AI systems that reason 
with uncertainty is to develop uncertainty mechanisms that are descri ptive 
of human reasoning, eschewing normative probability. While advocates 
claim these alternative calculi address the problem of cognitive dissonance, 
the tendency to deviate from normative rules is unacceptable for many ap­
plications. In any case, claims that these alternatives are descriptive of 
human reasoning have not been verified. 
Understanding and Explanation of Bayesian Inference 
The explanation technique described herein is based on the theory that 
Bayesian inference is, in fact, descri ptive of some human reasoning. A 
process model of uncertainty reasoning is proposed that (1) accounts for 
the systematic biases that people exhibit in assessing probability due to 
neglect of prior probabilities (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982), (2) 
includes procedures that are consistent with Bayes' rule, and (3) accounts 
for the selection of one set of procedures over the other.l 
Heuristics and Biases 
The heuristics of representativeness, availability, and anchoring and ad­
justment are procedures that account for errors in assessing probabilities due 
to neglect of base rates (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Consider a screening 
test known to detect the presence of drugs in 90% of users tested. An error due 
to neglect of base rates would be the inference that the probability of drug use 
by a person who tests positive is 0.9; i.e., the sensitivity of the test is mistaken 
for the posterior probability. This behavior is accounted for in my process 
model by a production which produces the heuristic that people who test posi­
tively are re presentative of people the test was designed to detect: 
IF a ?class has ?feature with probability ?p and 
?individual has ?featu re 
THEN ?individual is a ?class with probability ?p 
When ?class, ?feature, ?p, and ?individual are instantiated with elements in 
working memory, the resulting inference would be: 
IF a drug user has positive test with probability 0.9 and 
Joe Employee has positive test 
THEN Joe Employee is a drug user with probability 0.92 
1 I express the model in the ACT architecture of cognition (Anderson, 1983). In ACT, 
productions in procedural memory are selected for processing based on information in 
internal Short Term Memory along with salient information in foveal vision. 
2 Note that the MYCIN rule in the preceding section is essentially of the same form. 
The (.8) in the rule is the certainty associated with the rule, not the resulting 
certainty of the hypothesis. Thus, such explanations will reinforce disregard of base 
rate information. 
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Similarly, the heuristics of availability and anchoring and adjustment 
can be accounted for under the assumptions of ACT. 
Bayesian Thinking in Humans 
There is evidence suggesting that productions that account for prior prob­
ability are· part of people's procedural knowledge. For example, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) found that people use prior probabilities correctly when they 
have no other information but effectively ignore them when a description is 
introduced, even when the description is totally uninformative. Fischhoff, 
Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1979) found that subjects become sensitive to prior 
probabilities and to the reliability of evidence when successive problems are 
encountered that differ only in these variables; biases appear when the con­
text of the problem has not been seen often enough to allow these salient fea­
tures to be recognized. 
Including productions that account for these observations in a process 
model is not inconsistent with the existence of heuristics such as representa­
tiveness described above. A production that assigns posterior belief to be the 
prior probability is sufficient when only prior information is available. Pro­
cessing descriptive information could reduce the salience of prior informa­
tion, resulting in the representativeness heuristic being applied inappro-
priately .1 But extending this process model with productions that properly ac­
count for prior probability requires the identification of some additional pro­
ductions that plausibly could be part of basic inductive knowledge. Such pro­
ductions are suggested by Polya's "shaded inductive patterns": 
A implies B 
B almost certain anyway 
Btrue 
A very little more credible 
A implies B 
B without A hardly credible 
B true 
A very much more credible 
Their intuitive appeal indicates these "productions" may be part of basic induc­
tive knowledge. They seem consistent with the apparent relationship between 
surprise and modification of belief; unexpected observations revise the likeli­
hood of a hypotheses more than evidence consistent with current belief: 
Perhaps the main biological function of surprise is to jar us into reconsidering the 
validity of some hypotheses ... To be surprised ... is to obtain a substantial Bayes 
factor (Good, in Shafer, 1982, p. 343) 
Importantly, Polya's patterns describe reasoning that can be modeled by 
Bayes' rule. For example, if "B almost certain anyway" is interpreted as the 
marginal P(B) (the divisor in Bayes' rule) being close to 1.0 and "A implies B" 
means P(B I A) is close to 1.0, then by Bayes rule the probability of A would be 
"very little more" than what it was prior to observing B.2 
The purpose of an explanation facility based on this model is to elicit the 
use of appropriate procedure's by the user. The critical factor is accounting 
for how alternative procedures are selected. 
Linguistic Representation of Probability 
Most investigations of subjective inference have been concerned with the 
underlying procedures used to process information rather than with modes of 
1 Salience of priors is largely under the control of a decision support system since, 
according to ACT, working memory includes elements in foveal vision. 
2Exactly how much more depends on the prior. 
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representation. But the representation of information in working memory can 
influence which problem solving procedures are selected (Simon, 1979). If 
humans have a variety of computational procedures for reasoning under un­
certainty then improved performance in inference tasks should be observed 
when more suitable representations are used. 
Cohen and Grinberg (1983) suggest that numerical representations of un­
certainty detract from understanding and that human judgment may be better 
than it appears from numerically expressed estimates. Linguistic expression 
of uncertainty might require a less complicated transformation for storage in 
short term memory, introducing less distortion than a numerical 
representation and resulting in better understanding (Freksa, 1982). Zimmer 
(1983) found that subjects judged probabilities better when verbal modes were 
employed and Zimmer (1985) reports evidence that verbal processing of 
knowledge of uncertainty reduces biases of conservatism and negligence of 
regression. His results indicate that people are much closer to optimal 
Bayesian revision when they are allowed to use linguistic expressions of 
probability. Oden (1977) obtained similar results for conjunctive and 
disjunctive reasoning: 
[probability rules] provide a substantially better fit to the data [than the rules 
of Possibility theory] for every (data) matrix and for the great majority of the 
subjects. (Oden, 1977) 
The observations that linguistic representation of uncertainty appear to 
improve reasoning support the conjecture that alternative processes for un­
certainty exist and that representation is a determining factor in which pro­
cesses are selected. It follows that stating explanations in linguistic form using 
relevant inference procedures will improve understanding. 
An Explanation Facility for Bayesian Inference 
An explanation facility consisting of templates which produce linguis­
tic representations of Bayesian inference has been developed. The tem­
plates are based on the "shaded inductive patterns" of Polya (1954) and nat­
ural language term sets expressing probabilities and changes in probabili­
ties. The goal was to make the facility as domain independent as possible. 
This section describes some details . of a prototype implementation with em­
phasis on the psychological basis for implementation decisions. The first 
step was to choose a representative set of terms. 
Lexicon of Probability! 
For maximum explanatory power, translations from probabilities to natural 
language should convey as much information as possible but no more than the 
capability of the user to distinguish differences (to minimize cognitive load). 
The ability to distinguish meaningful differences in symbolic information is 
assumed to be governed by the capacity of Short Term Memory; about 5 sym­
bols (Simon, 1985). Note that in linguistic form, probabilities tend to have a 
natural subdivision point; hypothesis of probability less than the subdivision 
point are referred to as "unlikely", hypothesis with probability greater than 
the subdivision point are "likely". Thus, granularity of the lexicon can be sub­
stantially decreased by assuming that "chunking" occurs at the subdividing 
point. If the ability to easily distinguish levels of probability below and above 
the natural subdivision point are assumed to be governed by the hypothetical 
1 It is clear that the lexicon of probabilities will be domain dependant and require 
calibratio n. 
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capacity of STM, mm1mum granularity (maximum list size) for an effective 
lexicon of probability appears to be 11 (5 phrases on either side of a subdivi­
sion point term). Based on this analysis, the term set shown in Table 1 was 
adapted from Lichtenstein and Newman (1967) for use in the prototype.! 
Table 1: Term set for expressing probabilities 
TERM 
Almost certain 
Highly probable 
Quite likely 
Rather likely 
Better than even 
Fair chance 
RANGE OF APPLICATION2 
0.99 - 0.91 
Not quite even chance 
Somewhat unlikely 
Rather unlikely 
Improbable 
Highly improbable 
0.90 - 0.82 
0.81 - 0.73 
0.72 - 0.64 
0.63 - 0.55 
0.54 - 0.46 
0.45 - 0.37 
0.36 - 0.28 
0.27 - 0.19 
0.18 - 0.09 
0.08 - 0.01 
The lexicon selected to express the chan g e  from prior to posterior 
probability is more important than the lexicon of probabilities because 
change in belief is what Bayesian conditioning models. In contrast to the 
lexicon of probability just discussed, there is no obvious "cognitive break 
point" in comparison terms. Thus, the practical upper limit on term set size 
should be the same as the assumed symbol capacity of short term memory 
(i.e., 5). However, two lists are required, one for decreasing likelihood 
(disconfirming evidence) and one for increasing likelihood (confirming 
evidence). It remains an issue for further research to determine the best 
(most consistently used, etc.) set of terms. Table 2 shows the lists used in the 
prototype. 
Table 2: Term set for expressing change in probabilities 
Decreasing Certainty 
a great deal less likely 
much less likely 
quite a bit less likely 
somewhat less likely 
a bit less likely 
Increasing Certainty 
a great deal more likely 
much more likely 
quite a bit more likely 
somewhat more likely 
a bit more likely 
A major issue still under investigation is the exact nature of the mapping 
from the cross product space of prior and posterior probabilities to phrases de­
scribing change in belief. Consider describing a change in probability from 
1 Initial development assumed the range of probabilities to be [0,1] and the subdivision 
point to be 0.5. These assumptions are domain dependent. 
2The midpoints of term ranges should be equally spaced for language pragmatics when 
probabilities of interest are distributed over [0,1] (Zimmer, 1985). Where probabilities 
tend to cluster at one end of the unit interval, some transformation appears to be 
necessary. The characteristics of that transformation are not addressed in this paper. 
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0.91 to 0.95 with a change from 0.01 to 0.05. One might say that 0.95 is "slightly 
more likely" than 0.91, but that 0.05 is "a great deal more likely" than 0.01, 
even though the absolute differences. are the same. 
Oden (1979) found that subjects were consistent in their comparison of 
relative belief, reporting experimental evidence supporting the following 
relation: 
Rel(A, B) = Truth CA> 
Truth (A) + Truth (B) 
where Rel(A, B) is the relative truthfulness of statement A in relation to 
statement B and Truth(x) is a linguistic expression of belief in proposition 
x. The prototype was implemented using this relation; its domain indepen­
dence remains an issue for further investigation. 
T emplates 
Polya's Patterns of Plausible Inference are the inspiration for English 
language sentences in which these words are embedded. The patterns can eas­
ily be rephrased into production-like sentence structures which experience in 
deductive expert systems has shown to be acceptable to users. 
The marginal probability of evidence is the key used for selection of the 
templates. For example, a "small" marginal indicates that the evidence is 
unexpected or surprising. Because such a result strongly disconfirms prior 
belief, substantial belief revision is necessary. Conversely, a "large" 
marginal indicates evidence confirms prior belief; belief revision will be 
minimal. 
With the marginal as selection criteria for templates, only three basic 
situations will be encountered corresponding to confirming evidence, 
disconfirming evidence, and a middle ground where prior belief accommo­
dates either result. When only a single point of reference is used in an ap­
plication, the probability at which observing evidence is neither "likely" 
nor "unlikely" occurs when the marginal is in a neighborhood of 0.5; a 
point which appears to be application and domain independent. In the 
prototype sentences were structured so that operational meaning is con­
veyed by words selected from term sets, making only two templates neces­
sary. In hindsight, a single template appears sufficient for this application. 
Figures 1 and 2 show examples generated by the facility. 
Figure 1: Explanation of effect of anticipated evidence.l 
Based only on its structure, it is not quite an even chance that 
P345-22 is a carcmogen. 
Because a Positive Sister-Chromatid Exchanfj!e test is quite 
likely for a pyrrolizidine, the hypothesis that P345-22 is a 
carcinoflen is somewhat more likely, making it highly probable 
that P345-22 is a carcinoflen. 
1 Italics indicates the words selected from the term sets previously discussed. 
Underltnin� indicates application dependent terms. 
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Figure 2: Explanation when evidence is neither anticipated nor 
surprising 
Based ·only on its structure, it is somewhat unlikely that P98-
21 is a carcinogen. 
There is a fair chance of a Negative L5178Y test for a benz-a­
an thracene, making it a bif less likely that P98-21 is a 
carcinogen. It is improbable that P98-21 is a carcinogen. 
Acceptability 
The preceding sections relate a theory of understanding that provide 
the basis for explanation of Bayesian conditioning. The usual AI technique 
for validating the acceptability of such a program is to demonstrate it for a 
target population of users. The testimony of potential users is, of course, 
the weakest of acceptability tests, but is prudent before continuing devel­
opment. To that end, a decision support application in which normative 
inference was a central issue to the system's acceptance was selected to 
prototype this explanation technique. The Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) risk analysis of new chemicals mandated by the Toxic Sub­
stances Control Act provided an appropriate domain. A prototype decision 
support system for analysis of short-term mutagenicity test results was de­
signed. The purpose of the system is to determine the probability of car­
cinogenicity of a new chemical. Based on a chemical's structure, a prior 
probability is assigned. The program calculates the posterior probability 
of carcinogenicity based on test results and expert knowledge of the appli­
cability of the tests to various chemical classes. If requested by the user, 
the most definitive follow-up test is recommended. Both the initial analy­
sis and the recommendation of the follow-up test are explained using the 
facility described herein. 
An Agency consultant familiar with EPA decision makers cautioned that 
they would "never use" a Bayesian decision support system because they do 
not understand the probabilities (Clifford, 1985). But based on interviews 
with EPA toxicologists, it appears the facility produces understandable and 
acceptable explanations of single step Bayesian conditioning. 
Ef fectiveness 
Such a demonstration hardly constitutes validation of the model or sup­
ports the contention that Bayesian conditioning can be made understand­
able enough to remove it as an impediment to acceptability of normative 
decision support systems. The central issue is whether decision makers 
"understand" output enough to act on the recommendations of the pro­
gram. This question is obviously difficult to test directly; it was necessary 
to construct an experiment that tested a side effect. 
It is easy to demonstrate that subjects do not understand Bayesian condi­
tioning. Present subjects with a scenario which includes information about 
prior probability (e.g., a population average) and some evidence that is con­
ditionally related to the target condition (e.g., an indicator which exhibits 
false negative and false positive rates) and most subjects will ignore the prior, 
mistaking the true positive rate to be the posterior probability. When in­
formed of the normative posterior the subject will be confused how such a re­
sult could be correct; i.e., he will not "understand" it. If, in the 
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(unannounced) presence of an explanation, a subject's answer is consistent 
with the normative posterior we might conclude he "understands" the in­
ference. This is the essential outline of the experiment conducted to deter­
mine the effectiveness of the explanation facility. 
Design 
Seven problems were presented in random order to each subject. The 
problems were duplicities of, or isomorphic to, inference problems from the 
"heuristics and biases" literature. For each problem the subject selected one 
of five sub-intervals of the unit interval in which he thought the probability 
in question fell. A between-groups design was used. A control group was giv­
en the original problems and the treatment group was given identical materi­
als with an explanation generated by the prototype facility. Unlike a decision 
support system, there was no attention drawn to the explanation; it was simply 
included in the text immediately prior to the question concerning the proba­
bility. 
Subjects 
Two groups of approximately 50 subjects each returned materials. The 
groups were randomly selected from a list of Members of the Technical 
Staff of the MITRE Corporation Washington Center. Follow-up questions 
indicated that the two groups were essentially the same in all relevant re­
spects (typical level of education, exposure to decision analysis concepts, 
etc.). 
Results 
Replicating results from the literature, the maJonty of subjects in the 
control group neglected prior probability and chose the "biased" answer. 
As the histograms of subject responses in the figures below demonstrate, 
exposure to the explanation resulted in a discernable shift to the interval 
containing the normative solution. 
While this experiment only indirectly addresses the central issues of 
this research, it does provide encouragement to continue development of 
both the model and the facility. 
40 
30 
Percent 
Response 
10 
0 
Normative 
100-81 
HLV-1 Test 
80-61 60-41 
Subject Response 
With Explanation 
401 
40-21 20-0 
Without Explanation 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
50 
40 
30 
Percent 
Response 
10 
0 
Summary 
100-81 
Aircraft Engine 
80-61 60-41 40-21 20-0 
Subject Response 
This paper describes an explanation facility based on a cogmuve model 
which predicts that conditional reasoning can be manipulated to produce 
results described by normative rules of probability. The maximum effec­
tive length of the lexicons of probability, the transformation from the 
cross product space of prior and posterior probability to the term set used to 
describe change in probability, and the basic sentence structures are sus­
pected to be domain-independent features of the explanation technique. 
Preliminary evidence indicates that the facility is both acceptable to po­
tential users and effective in overcoming the "haze of Bayes" (Polister, 
1984). 
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